The big tent of great American plays is broad enough to contain works of both tragic and comic sensibilities: The Iceman Cometh, A Streetcar Named Desire, and Death of a Salesman among the first; The Front Page, The Man Who Came to Dinner, and The Odd Couple among the second. I don’t think anybody would want to be without any of these great plays. The post-Godot era cautions us that it’s increasingly difficult to navigate the thorny path of strict generic definition: there are plays, yes, though few comedies and tragedies as such. We can still identify comic or tragic strains in each though, and consider whether a play primarily falls upon one side of that fence or the other. But abandon all hope, ye who venture further. It’s enough to say, maybe, that a healthy dramatic culture — and a healthy dramatic criticism — has room for both, as did the ancient Greek and Elizabethan theatrical eras, and all their possible admixtures.
For decades an anti-comic prejudice prevailed, however. Great plays were necessarily “serious” — it was the serious plays, the “dramas,” that were awarded best play prizes, while comedies and farces were dismissed as inconsequential entertainments. Two minutes’ thought demolishes such a prejudice and characterization (the plays of Peter Barnes, Jules Feiffer’s Little Murders, and even Neil Simon’s The Prisoner of Second Avenue put the lie to it — all of which are ripe for revival, by the way, given the times), but now the argument has swung round, according to two major New York theatre critics. In two examples from five years apart, an anti-tragic prejudice can be identified — and these examples indicate the dangers of positing personal taste as critical dicta.
Exhibit A: Last week in the Wall Street Journal, Terry Teachout offered a few thoughts on “Why Comedy is Truer to Life Than Tragedy.” (Terry’s most recent work for the theatre is a play about Louis Armstrong.) It is not just that Terry likes to laugh more than he likes to cry; that’s fine. But he bases his critical vision of theatre and drama on that preference. “As I grow older, I grow more firmly convinced that comedy is truer to life than tragedy, not just onstage but in all the narrative art forms,” he says, and he goes on to compare Shakespeare’s greatest comedy, Twelfth Night, with his greatest tragedy, King Lear (an assessment with which, by the way, I agree). The problem with Lear, Terry says, is that, at bottom, it is less true than Twelfth Night, it is less “real”: “Yes, King Lear is charged with universal feelings — but it isn’t real. Not only is it set in a far-off fairyland of kings and queens, but it ends, like most of Shakespeare’s tragedies, with a mile-high stack of corpses, a horrific spectacle that precious few of us have had the misfortune to behold.”
Well, not if you’ve seen news photographs from the Middle East over the past ten years or so, from the political prisons of Iraq to the streets of Syria, let alone elsewhere. When I read Terry’s pronouncement that “comedy is truer to life than tragedy” to my wife, she immediately got to the heart of the matter: “That depends on whose life you’re talking about, doesn’t it?” she said.
The critical as well as the aesthetic eye requires a certain amount of imagination and compassion, especially when confronting those forms or plays which may have a different conception of life than your own. There’s a political and ideological side to this as well, which I won’t go into here. It’s not that Terry is as conservative in his politics as he is in his critical perspective — I don’t know that that’s true, because we’ve never discussed politics, and he’s never written about it. The fact that he writes for the Wall Street Journal doesn’t tell us anything. After all, Hugh Kenner regularly wrote for the National Review under William F. Buckley’s editorship, and that didn’t make Kenner a raging reactionary or traditionalist: quite the opposite.
My Exhibit B drives this point home: Time Out New York theatre editor David Cote’s assertion that “I don’t think there are any more tragedies,” he wrote in a 2007 blog post (his emphasis), and though this is rather a different construction than Terry’s, it’s a distinction without a difference, regardless of his own politically progressive stance. (David’s most recent work for the theatre is an opera about a dominatrix.) “We’re no longer so primitive as a people to enshrine the concept of tragedy the way we might, say, human sacrifice or other pathetic early religious rituals,” he wrote. “To me, embracing this neo-tragedy is just inviting pretension and bathos. Misery, gloom, morbidity, sorrow, pain and grief are modes. Laughable in extreme forms, and ultimately too great a reliance on them obviates humor and desensitizes the viewer.” In a comment to his post, David further thanks evolution for obviating the need for tragedy: “How can I square progressive optimism, a distrust of human animal instinct and a profoundly atheist worldview? Evolution, simply. We do awful things to each other, yet our morals and methods evolve towards greater kindness and complexity.” And I look at those news photographs again and ask that Charles Darwin call his office, please.
Like Terry’s observation, David’s admission of personal taste (“to me”) rapidly crosses into a critical dictum. As far apart as they may be in other respects, they come to an odd agreement that the tragic mode or the tragic consciousness is less real or true for contemporary times — for contemporary drama and theatre as well — than the comic. Whether it’s Terry’s view that tragedy is less real or David’s view that tragedy is less relevant, both speak to a critical anti-tragic prejudice every bit as damaging to the health of a dramatic culture as an anti-comic prejudice. As my wife suggested, it excludes an entire swathe of human experience as somehow invalid, or at least inferior to comedy, as a mode of or subject for dramatic and theatrical representation — and makes for a much poorer dramatic and theatrical culture precisely because of this exclusion.
The dramatist who explores the possibility of tragedy in contemporary times — as well as the audience seeking it, or the critic who wants to write about it — should certainly take note of this critical atmosphere. I don’t know if Terry, or any given “audience” in general, shares David’s reasons as to why he goes to the theatre at all: “I go to the theater, generally, for rhetoric, visual stimulation and emotional manipulation,” he said in 2007. It’s not why I go, and I’m not alone. (People don’t go to the theatre not only because of what they know is there, but also because of what they know isn’t there.) And though I don’t know the positions of Ben Brantley, Michael Feingold, or other major American critics on the matter (something may be inferred from their reviews, perhaps), I know at least Terry’s and David’s. But if we’re to have a theatre and drama that are central to American experience and aesthetic expression, and not a mere amusing and self-congratulatory ornament in a post-capitalist culture, we need to do better than this.

A question: Did you mistype when you wrote, “People don’t go to the theatre not only because of what they know is there, but also because of what they know isn’t there”? Surely that second word doesn’t belong there.
Incidentally, it’s not easy for me to say why I go to the theater. I lack the means–i.e., time and/or money–to do it as often as I’d like, and I end up making choices for what I think are a number of different reasons. Ideally, I’d like to say I go to the theater _to find out what’s there,_ although in practice I often have some idea ahead of time. But I can say, though it doesn’t go very far, that I go to the theater because I love it.
A comment: When you wrote in your second paragraph of “the dangers of positing personal taste as critical dicta,” my immediate reaction was to wonder something like the following. One expects a critic basically to have educated him- or herself through study, experience both inside and outside the theater (or whatever one’s field is), and debate, but don’t the differences among critical perspectives depend in part on some nugget of the person? To take a pair of examples chosen quickly and randomly, it’s possible that some such personal difference underlay George Steiner’s decision to write a book on tragedy while Erich Segal wrote one on comedy (they are The Death of Tragedy and The Death of Comedy respectively), although a simpler reason is easy to imagine.
But having finished reading your post, George, I realize that you probably intended “personal taste” to mean something much more…superficial. What we can regard as personal taste in Terry Teachout and David Cote, to judge only from what you’ve quoted here, could just as well be labeled critical shortcomings. I don’t mind learning that Teachout leans toward comedy, or that Cote has a personal fondness for “rhetoric, visual stimulation and emotional manipulation.” Their confessions will guide me, in some small way, in evaluating their reviews. But the critical positions they extrapolate from those predilections are simply unsupportable (surely I need not add “to me”). One can look either to the theater itself or, as your wife proposed, to the world beyond its walls to learn better.
No, I didn’t mistype, John — just wanted to emphasize (as is my tendency I’m afraid) the negative over the positive. And I didn’t mean to say that the present-day theatre and drama have nothing to offer to those with half a brain. They have plenty to offer to those with half a brain.
In regard to your last paragraph, I suppose it can be argued that this is one of the pitfalls when a writer moves from reviews (which are what David and Terry usually write) to criticism; reviews tend to be more immediate and “personal” (in the least interesting sense of the word), criticism more leisurely and nuanced and impersonal (in the least interesting sense of the word), with room for internal debate. But basta.
I’d add, in George’s defense, that I think what he’s getting at is that their arguments risk being completely myopic. There’s not a lot of sense they’re applying to themselves and their own perspectives the same level of skepticism and engagement they theoretically apply to the work, so what we wind up with, ironically, is a mere statement of “Well this is just why I like” posing as longer thought pieces.
I don’t think I’d characterize David’s post as a “longer thought piece,” at least in its original form. One can string his comments beneath together, however, to get a rather more cohesive view of his statement (so long as one ignores the gratuitous ridicule and strained humor which he seems to believe passes for “wit”). But yes. Reading these along with Andy Horwitz’s essay at Culturebot today gives a coherent picture of the health of the critical condition nowadays.
I remember your 2007 dialog with Cote very well and thought of it last week as I was reading Lionel Abel’s “Metatheatre” (1963). Abel maintains that Hamlet made tragedy henceforth impossible because his signature self-consciousness precludes the kind of blind, hubristic action necessary to tragedy. His general bent seems to follow Cote’s: that we have evolved beyond the tragic and into the self-conscious. But as I see it, self-consciousness all too quickly turns to self-absorption which turns back into hubris — so what seems to be evolution on one scale (or to one taste) is really just another revolution on the axis of tragedy.
I think Abel, for one, charts the larger current in playwriting very well (and very clearly) but I also think he choses a very poor specimen in Hamlet for the seminal metadrama and slayer of tragedy. In an approving review of Abel, Susan Sontag defined tragedy as “the collision of subjective intention with objective fate … an ennobling vision of nihilism.” I like her definition, too, though I could have sworn Hamlet’s subjective intention to kill one man collided rather tragically with the objective fate of killing another man, Polonius. So much for prodigious self-consciousness as a triumph over tragedy.
In any case, the coinage of a new term like “metatheatre” (like the overused “tragicomedy” and awful “dramedy”) only masks the tragic core of that classic; it doesn’t exorcise it. And while we may have moved, culturally, from tragedy and down the nauseating hall of mirrors that is metatheatre (or whatever fare Cote and Teachout prefer) I still don’t see how anyone can declare that tragedy is now therefore impossible, dead, or unworthy of consideration.
An incisive comment as always, Karl. I imagine that a piece of this lies in the favoring of an Aristotelian view of tragedy — which is not the only one; Abel seems to be comparing apples to oranges in that the conception of the tragic consciousness developed somewhat in the centuries separating Euripides from Marlowe, and it’s continued to develop from Marlowe to Barker. I do like your conception of a “self-consciousness” which “all too quickly turns to self-absorption which turns back to hubris,” a fine way to put it.